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GAZELLES VERSUS EMPLOYMENT VARIATION FOR SOME OECD COUNTRIES: 99-01; 00-02; 01-03 
Introduction
Over decades there has been much debate about whether small or large firms contribute the most to net employment creation 1 . There is, however, broad consensus about the fact that relatively few firms, be them small or large, known as high-growth firms or Gazelles 2 , are responsible for the majority of jobs created. Birch and Medoff (1994) , for example, estimate for the USA that during the 1988-1992 period, 4% of ongoing firms created about 60% of the jobs. Similarly, Storey (1994) reviews several studies for diverse countries and estimates than, in average, 4% of firms get to create about half of new jobs over a decade. Schreyer (2000) reviews the results from 6 OECD countries 3 and concludes that, in spite of the diverse data sources and methodologies, high-growth firms account for a disproportionately large part of net job creation in all countries analysed. Not only that,
as Figure 1 below shows there is a strong correlation between the prevalence rate of Gazelles in different OECD countries and their corresponding aggregate employment variation rates. 4 Of course a simple bivariate scatterplot as the one shown in Figure 1 does not necessarily capture any causal relationship between Gazelles and aggregate employment creation rates, but taken together with the reported evidence on the important net job creation of high-growth firms, it constitutes a wake-up call for policy-makers.
But what do we know about Gazelles? What do they look like? Where are they?
What can governments do so there are more of them? In spite of different criteria used in the literature to classify a firm as a Gazelle, different data sources, time periods or methodologies, a number of results turn out to be quite robust. First, although high-growth firms can be of all sizes, small firms seem to be overrepresented. Moreover, among high-growth firms, small firms' job creation rates exceed those of large ones. Although there are large firms classified as well as Gazelles, their employment growth is mostly "acquired", that is, due to some kind of restructuring such as mergers or acquisitions. Second, high-growth firms tend to be younger than average. Overall it seems that newness is a more important factor for this group of firms than smallness. And third, there are high-growth firms in all industries not only, as it could be believed, in high-technology industries. If anything, there seems to be some overrepresentation in market services.
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Apart from size, sector and age, variables included in almost every single study on this topic, other dimensions of interest are analysed as well by a number of papers.
For example, there is some consensus about the fact that high-growth firms are more technology intensive than average firms. EIM (2006) estimates that in the Netherlands about 40% of high-growth firms spend 10% of turnover or more in R&D whereas only 30% of slow growers devote such an effort to those activities. Schreyer (2000) finds a similar result in his review of the phenomenon in 6 OECD countries. In Spain, for example, he estimates that whereas about 50% of manufacturing firms undertake some R&D activity, the percentage increases to 70% when it comes to high-growth firms. 6 The fact that Gazelles tend to be, to a certain extent, technology intensive young small firms explains the frequency with which they report having difficulties accessing to external financing. Indeed, there are at least four specific characteristics of R&D investment which might explain the existence of credit restrictions [see Hall (2002) ]:
First, the investment outcome is highly uncertain and, therefore, risky. Second, information asymmetries might be very important and insurmountable due to the secrecy around this type of activities to protect intellectual property. Third, the output of this investment is, broadly speaking, knowledge, an intangible asset which is very difficult to collateralize.
And fourth, there is a long gap of time between the time of investment and the time of reaping the rewards from it. Hence, innovative firms might have a cash-flow shortage problem that could difficult even further their access to finance. Add to this equation the reported difficulties of young small firms to access finance due to lack of track record or collateral 7  and you have a probable case of underinvestment which might be reducing the number of high-growth firms.
Additionally, high-growth firms seem to spend more time and money in staff training and to hire more qualified workers than the average firm. EIM (2006), for example, estimates that Gazelles spend 70% more of time in staff training than slow growers. The information we have about this phenomenon stemming from interviews with entrepreneurs point in the same direction: Europe's 500 8 , for example, shows that the key for success of the European most dynamic entrepreneurs during the 80s was human capital.
See for example the literature review of Henreksson and Johansson (2008).
6. The Spanish case study of Schreyer (2000) is based on the "Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales", a representative sample of manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees.
See Coluzzi et al. (2008).
8. Europe's 500 focus on the 500 most dynamic European entrepreneurs between 1979 and 1984.
Finally, in Schreyer (2000) some country studies distinguish between independent firms and those that are partly or wholly owned by another firm. All of them conclude that dependent firms play a more than proportional part in the group of high-growth firms.
They attribute this finding to three possible factors, also associated to reported constraints to growth: 1) dependent firms have easier access to finance; 2) dependent firms have better access to human capital whenever recruitment, training and mobility involve fixed costs and/or a minimum size; 3) dependent firms have easier access to information about markets, products and technologies.
In spite of the importance of this topic from a policy-point of view, most of the studies of Gazelles are descriptive and limited to a comparison of the characteristics of the high-growth group with respect to a control group of firms. However, a multivariate analysis of the determinants of the fast growth of firms would be required to disentangle the effect of the different variables reported to be important. That is precisely the first aim of this paper. Using firm-level data for Spanish firms, operating in all sectors of the economy, we run a probit regression to estimate the partial effect of each of the possible determinants of high-growth suggested by the literature reviewed above. Among those determinants we include sector of activity, age and region but also the capital structure of the firm and the relative qualification of the workforce at the beginning of the period. Given the fact that we have several years of information we are able to control for the fact that a firm marked as a gazelle in a certain period was also a high-growth firm in the previous period. Apart from controlling for some of the endogeneity issues which arise in this type of regressions, this procedure will allow us to study the growth inertia of this group of firms.
The second contribution of the paper is the analysis of the characteristics and determinants of Gazelles for the specific case of Spain. To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper addressing the phenomenon in Spain is Schreyer (2000) , who
summarises the results from 6 OECD country studies using a homogeneous methodology and treatment of the data so as to be as comparable as possible. 9 The Spanish study is based on the Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE) database, including firm-level information for about 1,200 manufacturing established firms for the period 1990 to 1994.
The dataset includes a representative sample of firms with more than 10 but less than 200 employees and virtually all firms with more than 200 employees. Given the results elsewhere about the newness of high-growth firms as well as their overrepresentation in the service sector, the exclusion of entries and the focus of the Spanish study in the manufacturing sector could be affecting the results. Moreover, the study excludes all firms with less than 10 employees which, given the reduced average size of firms in Spain, could also be leaving out of the analysis a large number of potential fast growers.
The database used in this paper has been constructed at the Bank of Spain to overcome these problems. It contains firm-level information from the provincial firm registries and the National Institute of Statistics (INE) and offers at least four advantages with respect to other databases. First, there is little undersampling of small and young firms. Second, it includes all entries and exits. Third, it covers the whole market economy (but the financial sector). Fourth and last characteristic of our dataset is that the relatively long time span allows us to study different waves of high-growth firms so as to check the consistency of our findings as well as to control for possible endogeneity.
9. Hoffman and Junge (2006) count the number of high-growth firms in Spain, in order to compare it with that in other countries, but they do not perform any further analysis about Gazelles´ characteristics or determinants.
The next section describes briefly the database and goes over the definition of high-growth firms used in this paper. Section 3 performs a descriptive analysis of Gazelles which includes an account of their importance in terms of employment in Spain. Section four performs a probit analysis in order to study the main determinants of fast employment growth. Section five looks at the growth process of this group of firms. The purpose is to learn what type of employees and finance use Gazelles in Spain to sustain their impressive growth. Finally, section six concludes. Data and definitions
The database
The Although all societies are obliged by law since 1990 to deposit every year their financial accounts in the regional firm registries, provision of employment data is not compulsory. Furthermore, the cost of processing electronically the statements is quite high which means that only the readable and quality-printed financial statements are processed electronically every year by the "Centro de Procesos Estadísticos", dependent on the regional firm registries. Both circumstances imply that "only" the financial statements of about 60% of all active firms every year are sent to the "Central de Balances del Banco de España" (CB).
The CB does not incorporate about 10% of the firms received from the firm registries to its database because either they belong to the financial sector, not covered by the CB, or because the firms are already collaborating on voluntary grounds with the CB. Firms that are received and processed by the CB pass several logical and arithmetic filters to detect statements with severe incoherencies in their balance sheets and employment figures (total assets should be equal to total liabilities, for example, and the employment figure provided should be in concordance with the reported labour expenses). Surprisingly, only about half of the financial statements received pass those, truly not too demanding, tests.
The next table shows the number of firms dropped at each stage of the process. We end up with about one-third of all active societies each year.
10. All regional firm registries send the statements to a central unit created in 1996 that processes electronically the information (the "Centro de Procesos Estadísticos" or CPE). It is the CPE who at the end of each year sends the electronic information to the CB. Amongst the firms that do present coherent financial statements at least one year, we find that many "disappear" from the registry to appear year/s later. We checked whether firms with no data in one specific year in their history were systematically different from those providing information that year, given both groups of firms had the same age and belonged to the same sector, by comparing their average employment and productivity when the information was provided. We found no systematic differences. We also looked for differences between firms whose financial accounts were never, during the period of analysis, processed by the firm registries, and those that did, at least one year, in terms of sector and employment at constitution year (information provided by DIRCE). We found that the proportion of firms in the construction and hotels and restaurants sectors belonging to the first group those that never deposited their accounts or were not processed by the firms registries was clearly larger than the proportion of firms in those two sectors that collaborated with the firm registries. The proportion of firms with no employees at birth was also higher within the first group.
Given the fact that the firm registry information is fairly incomplete due to the numerous gaps found in the history of some firms, we were unable to deduct the date of entry and exit of the firms solely from the presence or absence of data in the registry, as it is done in other countries. For that reason we had to resort to a second source of data.
The Bank of Spain made a special request to "Directorio Central de Empresas" (DIRCE), run by the National Statistics Institute to get, under strict confidentiality clauses, the fiscal identification numbers, employment, sector and region of all Limited Liability Societies and Corporations that entered or exited the market between 1996 and 2003. DIRCE is, therefore, the main source of data to establish the entry and exit date of firms. It is important to stress that DIRCE records an entry whenever a new fiscal identification number is given to a firm. An exit is recorded when a fiscal identification number disappears.
That means that any restructuring of firms (M&A) resulting in a new identification number will be recorded as an entry by DIRCE. Using information from large firms collaborating with the Bank of Spain we have estimated that around 5% of entries of firms with less than 20 employees and most of the entries recorded by DIRCE of firms with more than 100 employees could be the result of some kind of restructuring process or "false" entries.
Moreover, we have no way to know whether observed employment growth of already established firms responds to an internal process of growth or, on the contrary, it is "acquired" growth stemming from M&A. 11 Please keep these caveats in mind when interpreting the results of the paper.
NUMBER OF FIRMS IN SAMPLE

We crossed the demographic information provided by DIRCE with the economic variables provided by the CB using the unique fiscal identification number of the societies in order to construct our database. Given the fact that firms in this literature are classified as fast growers on the basis of their employment or turnover growth over a period of several years, we construct five different 3-year datasets 12 and study the characteristics of high-growth firms in each of them. This procedure makes it possible to check the robustness of our results
given that fast growers are not always the same across windows. Moreover, it allows us to look into the immediate past and future of the fast growers in a certain window to study their growth volatility as well as to control for possible endogeneity in the empirical analysis.
The selection of firms to be analysed in each of the 3-year windows was as follows:
Firstly we selected all established and new firms in t, initial year of the period of analysis;
those are the active firms in t, around 300,000 in average, as Table 2 shows. Then we chose among the active firms with one or more employee those that survived till the end of the period, t+3, and had complete employment data (both in t and t+3). That left us with about 100,000 firms in average every period. Lastly, according to the criteria provided in the next section, we marked the group of firms with high employment growth.
It is important to stress that the set of firms with complete data in each of the 3-year windows is representative of the total population, at least in terms of sector of activity, legal form and employment. In order to see that, we compare the distribution across sectors and employment of the total population of active firms in 1999 constituted as Corporations or Limited Liability in the business economy provided by the National Statistics Institute with that in our sample of active firms corresponding to the period 1999-2002. Table 3 below shows the result of the exercise. The results do not change if another 3-year window was chosen instead.
11. This is important given that Davidsson and Delmar (2003) find that small firms grow organically to a larger extent while larger firms do so through M&A. 12. The datasets are: 1996-1999; 1997-2000; 1998-2001; 1999-2002; 2000-2003 . 
Definition of high-growth firms
There are several criteria to classify a firm as a Gazelle which combine in one manner or the other employment size and growth rate. Birch et al. (1995) , for example, required a positive turnover growth every year and a doubling of turnover in a five-year window. Firms had to have a minimum initial turnover of $100,000. Hoffman and Junge (2006) require a two-year growth of at least 60% with a minimum of 20% growth per year. There is as well a requirement on initial employment of 15 employees. Schreyer (2000) proposes in his OECD study a combined measure of relative and absolute firm employment growth following earlier work of Birch (1987) . The idea is that a growth measure meant to reflect successful management, innovation strategies etc. should not a priori favour any firm size class.
The proportional rate of change of employment, a relative measure, would introduce a clear bias towards small firms. On the other hand, absolute employment growth, measured in employees, would introduce a bias towards large firms. The combined indicator proposed, which will be called the "Schreyer indicator" and is shown in (1) below, has been proven to give rise to the smallest bias towards any size class.
where Xt+3 and Xt denote employment at the end and at the beginning of the period respectively. High-growth firms will be then chosen as the 10% with the highest value of the indicator.
The OECD proposes a second indicator to classify firms as high-growth similar to that of Birch (1995) and of Hoffman and Junge (2006) . It is based on average annualised employment growth it should be greater than 20% per year in a 3-year window but with a minimum initial employment size of 10 employees requirement in order to minimise the bias towards small firms. as firms (sole proprietors are not included) with an employment growth rate higher than 60% over two years (from t to t+2) with a minimum annual growth of 20%. Table 4 below shows the prevalence rates across OECD countries for the three 2-year windows analysed. Spain (1) refers to the percentage of high-growth firms in Spain estimated by Hoffman and Junge (2006) and Spain (2) to the prevalence rate estimated using our data but the selection criteria of Hoffman and Junge (2006) . The purpose of the comparison is to check the general validity of our data, although the cross-country comparison should be done with the Hoffman and Junge data for internal consistency reasons. high-growth firms in our database is larger. The reason could be that our sample includes only firms which have voluntarily deposited their accounts and employment information in the firm registries during the period of analysis. That is, there is a probable under-representation of firms going through difficulties. This possible self-selection problem should not affect, however, the results of the probit analysis since we study the relative characteristics of high-growth firms when compared to the characteristics of the slow growers in the group (of possibly self-selected firms). Furthermore, the fact that we count with a large number of firms in our sample ensures that those relative results are quite reliable.
We turn now to the importance in terms of employment of Gazelles in Spain. If we restrict the sample to small firms it seems that the average initial size of fast growers is only slightly larger than that of non-growers. But three years later, the average size of small fast growers is 18 employees whereas that of the sample of small surviving firms is 6.
The result is that 7.7% of firms marked as fast-growers in the group of small firms account for about 80% of net employment creation over a three-year period of all firms classified as small.
17.
The average size of active firms in t which survive up to t+3 and provide data is, in average, 13 employees versus 50 and 52 employees for Schreyer and OECD high-growth firms respectively. 
HIGH-GROWTH FIRMS AND EMPLOYMENT
Gazelles are therefore important job creators. What else do we know about them?
We proceed first to do a descriptive analysis similar to that in other studies on this same topic. We compare the distribution of firms according to size, sector, status and region in the high-growth group with the distribution in the control group (active firms in t that survived to t+3, present data in both years and are not classified as fast growers).
Other studies [Birch and Medoff (1994) explains that, in the aggregate, the concentration of fast growers in services is actually smaller than the concentration of slow growers in that sector.
A quarter of high-growth firms are start-ups that is, they entered the market in t vis-à-vis 13% of slow growers. Moreover, 20% of all new firms in t that survive over to t+3 grow so much as to be defined a Gazelle. Newness then seems to be quite important to explain high-growth. Lastly, the distribution of Gazelles across regions is very similar to that of slow growers, maybe with the exception of the Madrid region were the concentration is slightly higher. Hence, the region where the firm operates seems to be the least important of all high-growth determinants.
This first approach to the analysis of the characteristics of the Gazelles in Spain shows that there are high-growth firms across all sizes, sectors and regions. Although there is a high percentage of small Gazelles and of high-growth firms in the service sector, as it was expected given the results elsewhere, those percentages are actually smaller than the ones found in the control group of slow growers. The only clear result in Table 3 is the relatively larger presence of young firms amongst fast growers compared to that in the control group.
However, in order to disentangle the impact of age or any other characteristic on the probability of growth from that of other variables one has to resort to a multivariate analysis.
That is what we do in the next section.
Determinants of firms' growth: A probit analysis
In order to disentangle the partial effects of the different variables considered in the previous section on the probability of being a high growth firm, and to assess their significance, we need to estimate a multivariate equation. The bulk of the analysis of this section assumes that the dependent variable is a categorical variable, adopting the value of 1 for high-growth firms according to the definitions accepted in the literature and introduced in the previous section, and 0 for the rest of firms. However the employment growth thresholds above which a firm is defined as a Gazelle are arbitrary and do not respond to any break in the growth distribution of firms. For that reason, and in spite of the fact that the main purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants and characteristics of a very specific group of firms, we include as well in this section a regression where the dependent variable is firm growth with no particular minimum threshold, defined as the (continuous) value of the Schreyer indicator. The results of this latter regression will shed light on the issue of whether the included explanatory variables are important to determine not only whether a firm belongs or not to the high-growth group, but also its position within each of the groups.
We take all regressors at their value in the first year of the period considered, to ensure that they are, at least, predetermined with respect to actual growth process.
For reasons explained below we will concentrate our analysis in two windows of three years:
1999-2002 and 2000-2003. However, we will also perform the analysis using pooled data for all the five 3-year windows.
As it was mentioned in the introduction, apart from age, sector and the region of activity of the firm there are other firm-specific characteristics that might affect the probability of high growth. Among them, human capital and access to finance are two of the most frequently mentioned. Please note that some of these variables could bear some endogeneity problems. For example, the financial possibilities-high growth channel could also operate the other way around: a firm with a high growth history could be more attractive to lenders.
A similar problem can be found regarding the effect of average human capital. Our strategy to tackle this potential endogeneity problem is twofold. First, given that we have data from 1996 to 2003 we are in a position to control for the fact that firms marked as Gazelles in one period experienced also fast growth in the previous period. 20 We can do this exercise for two 3-year 
21.
Given that the maximum likelihood estimation does not lead to convergence we use the Newey's two-step estimator which allows fitting a probit model with multiple endogenous regressors. However, this methodology tests whether the estimated coefficient of the endogenous regressor is significantly different from zero, but it cannot be used for postestimation analyses such as calculating marginal effects. Hence the probit results will be shown as a robustness check but the marginal effect of the variables will be computed for the model controlling for past growth of firms (our first strategy to tackle the endogeneity problem).
properly about the existence of correlation between the variables but not about causality.
We are currently working to find better instruments but consider that results obtained so far are interesting enough to be reported.
Explanatory variables
What follows is a short description of the explanatory variables and controls included in the analysis.
CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF THE FIRM
Firms' expansion requires financing. If due to information asymmetries, moral hazard, lack of tangible collateral or cash-flow problems some firms face financing constraints that hamper their growth, their financial structure will affect the probability of growth. In order to estimate this effect, we include as a regressor the share of total debt (long and short term)
over total liabilities of a firm (we also try using only the share of long-term debt over total liabilities). The reasoning behind the use of this variable is that all the problems stated before should have a stronger effect on debt than on equity. 22 If this is the case, a higher debt ratio could be a proxy for lower financing constraints. However, a very high gearing could increase the risk of a firm to find financing difficulties, or reflect past profitability or solvency problems. In order to capture possible non monotonic effects of the variable we included also among the explanatory variables a quadratic debt term.
HUMAN CAPITAL
Gazelles have been reported to spend more time and resources in staff training and to employ, in average, more qualified staff than slow growers. To estimate the quantitative impact of a firm's human capital upon its growth probability we include as a regressor two possible proxies for human capital: average salary and the salary premium paid by the firm.
The first human capital proxy, the average wage, is computed simply as the ratio of total wage bill over total employment. The second proxy, the wage premium, is calculated as the ratio of the average wage paid in the firm to that paid in other firms of the same 2-digit sector.
AGE
The estimation of the effect of age deserves special attention. Ideally, one should estimate the effect of each possible age on the probability of high growth. Unfortunately, our dataset does not have this information; we know the birth year of a firm only if it was created between 1996 and 2003. Moreover, the fact that we control for past growth of the firms marked as Gazelles in a given period implies that those high-growth firms had to be active over the previous period. For these two reasons we can only control for the fact that firms entered the market, or were already operating in it, at t-3. That is, when we analyse for example the determinants of firms marked as Gazelles during the period 1999-2002
we control for the fact that they were, or not, fast growers over the previous period, 1996-1999. That means that we can only mark firms that entered the market in 1996, the first year of the previous period. Consequently, our analysis of the effect of firm's age is limited to a dummy variable indicating if the firm is relatively younger (has three years of operations) than the rest.
22.
Hall (2002) reviews a number of papers testing the existence of financing restrictions to innovative firms and concludes that debt is a disfavoured source of finance for R&D investment.
If we did not control for past growth, that is, if there was no requirement for the firm to be active over the previous 3-year period, then we could control for the fact that the firm is a start-up. We do so in the pooled estimation of a probit model, where information on Gazelles in every 3-year window (five in total) is included.
CONTROLS
Given the results of table 2 and of other studies we include as controls the region and sector of activity of the firm. In the case of sector of activity, we try with five sector dummies grouping manufacturing and service industries according to their technology intensity, with 9 dummies for lower level sector aggregations as well as with 45 2-digit sector dummies. 23 As it has already been explained, we also include as a control a dummy capturing whether the firm was classified as a Gazelle in the previous adjacent period. Finally, in all the pooled data estimations we include a time dummy to control for the business cycle.
It is worth noting that size is not among the explanatory variables. The reason is that both definitions of high growth presented above combine in some way two elements:
growth rate and size. 24 Hence size cannot be one of the regressors. In spite of that, and to check the robustness of the results, as it is explained below we include in Annex a regression controlling for the fact that the firm is small (<20 employees), medium-sized (between 20 and 250 employees) or large (>250 employees). Table 6 below provides the basic descriptive statistics and definitions of the explanatory variables for the group of Gazelles (according to the Schreyer indicator) and for the rest of firms.
23.
The 5 sectors differing in technology intensity are: ICT producing and using manufacturing which are grouped under ICT manufacturing, non-ICT manufacturing, ICT services, non-ICT services and non-ICT others (basically, construction, utilities and mining). For a detailed account of these sectors, please refer to Annex 2. The 9 lower level sector aggregations are: Mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction, retail, hotels and restaurants, transports, telecommunications and other services. 24. This is obvious for the OECD definition. Regarding the Schreyer indicator, simple algebra reveals that it is the product of a quadratic growth term and a size term. Table 7 shows the result for six different models. Since we are estimating a probit model, the quantitative effect of the determinants on the probability of being a Gazelle vary with the value of the rest of covariates. Hence those effects will be reported separately in table 8. was not the case we could exclude the past growth dummy and use the observations of the five windows in our sample. In that case we could replace the age variable by a dummy reflecting the fact that a firm is a real start-up, i.e. it entered the market exactly at the beginning of the window. This is done in models 5 and 6. Since the age dummy is now closer to a real start-up, we include in model 5 the interaction of the new firm dummy with the financial variables. The purpose is to see if financial constraints have a stronger effect for new firms. Please note that we cannot include fixed effects in the pooled data estimations due to the lack of degrees of freedom given that we only have between one and five observations for each firm (three in average). Hence we cannot control for heterogeneity at a firm level. Nevertheless, what we can do is to control for differences between sectors at a very low aggregation level. This is done in model 6, where we replaced the previous five 25. Marginal effects will be calculated for Model 1, our benchmark model, where past growth is controlled for and human capital is proxied by the relative wage paid in the firm. 26. Both estimations have been done using the same set of observations.
Results
sectors by 45 two-digit sectors hoping to capture in this way some of the firm-level idiosyncrasies that could also be affecting the probability of growth of the firm. PROBIT COEFFICIENTS ***, ** and *: significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The past growth of Gazelles is a highly significant predictor for current growth.
In spite of this fact the coefficients of debt, wage and sector are very similar across models 1, 2, 3 and 4. This suggests that the possible existence of endogeneity is not affecting their estimation. This finding is important because it allows us to pool all the observations, from the five 3-year windows, and re-run the probit with alternative controls and specifications.
The observed growth inertia could be capturing the fact that the period of analysis, 1996 to 2003, is characterised by sustained and, in some sectors like construction, explosive employment growth. To check this possibility we take advantage of the fact that not all sectors grew during the overall period of analysis, especially during the dotcom crisis of the earlier 2000s. If past growth in those laggard sectors did not increase the probability of being a Gazelle then we could conclude that the observed growth inertia is solely a result of the expansive moment of the cycle. Model 2 includes in the regression interaction terms between the past growth dummy and 8 sector dummies, being construction our omitted sector. 27 We find that the past growth dummy is positive and significant in all sectors. Hence firms' growth inertia, or the fact that past growth is an important determinant of current growth, seems not to be responding solely to the expansive moment of the cycle but to be rather a more structural phenomenon in Spain.
27. The eight sectors are mining, manufacturing, utilities, retail, hotels and restaurants, telecommunications, transport and other services.
Even controlling for past growth, which as it has been mentioned is positive and very significant, other variables seem to be important for growth. The effect of the debt ratio of the firm has an inverted U-shape. That is, it is positive up to a certain point; beyond that point further increments of debt will reduce the probability of growth. The fact that the capital structure of a firm has a significant effect upon its probability of growth could reflect the presence of market failures. Our results seem to point in the same direction as the rest of the literature: those firms with better access to credit, a higher debt ratio, have higher chances to grow fast. The fact that the impact of debt is non-linear is consistent with the theory of optimal capital structure of the firm [Jensen (1986) ] which states that there is a mix of debt-equity which maximises the value of a firm. According to our estimations the maximum probability of growth is achieved when the debt ratio is almost 70%.
28 This is also consistent with Lopez-Garcia and Puente (2007) where it was found that the effect of debt on the probability of survival of a firm was also non-linear, with a maximum probability of survival between 50 and 75% debt ratio. We provide in the annex 1 (model A1)
an estimation replacing total debt by long term debt as a robustness check. The results are very similar although the estimation of the debt effect loses some accuracy.
The effect of wages paid in the firm relative to the average wage in the 2-digit sector of activity a proxy for the firm's human capital, is extremely robust, positive and significant. In Annex 1 (model A2) we show the coefficients of the regression when the firm's average wage instead of the relative wage is included as a proxy of human capital.
Results are almost identical. We have also included a quadratic term of the firm's average wage to study possible non-monotonicities, finding that the effect of the variable is always positive but marginally decreasing. The estimation using the log of the relative wage has this property and provides a better fit, hence it is the one shown in Table 5 .
The variable used to proxy human capital, relative wages, could be capturing the effect on growth of other related factors such as firm size or the existence of a firm-level collective agreement. To rule out the possibility that the impact of wages on growth is reflecting a pure size effect, we have included size dummies in a pooled data regression shown in Annex 1 (model A4). 29 The only purpose of the exercise is to check whether, after controlling for firm size, the results for the rest of the variables change or not dramatically. We go no further due to the fact that firm size is part of the definition of the dependent variable, as it was explained previously. But even so, the results are very similar to those in models 5 and 6 of Table 5 , the only difference being that the magnitude of the relative wage coefficient is somehow smaller. On the other hand, firms subject to a firm-level collective agreement are in a better position to adjust to short-term market conditions. This fact alone could be increasing their probability of growth when compared to that of other similar firms in terms of size etc., but subject to sector The regression includes a dummy capturing the age of the firm. However, for reasons explained previously, in models 1 and 2 we only can control for the fact that a 28. The estimation uses the coefficients of Model 1. In the first window the maximum is achieved at 65% and in the second window at 69%. 29. Dummies are defined for firms with less than 20 employees, between 20 and 250 employees and more than 250 employees. The reference is small firms (less than 20 employees).
period of analysis or, alternatively, was already an established firm at that time. We find that, when controlling for past growth, those relatively younger firms do not have a significantly higher probability of being Gazelles than the rest of the firms in the sample. Also in models 3
and 4, where past growth of the Gazelles is not controlled for, we find a very weak effect of the age dummy. This suggests that having entered the market several years before has little impact on the probability of high growth. But the story changes if one controls for the fact that the firm is a real start-up, that is, it has entered the market right at the beginning of the period of analysis. That is clearly revealed in models 5 and 6, which use pooled data and show that actual start-ups (firms born in t) have a significantly higher probability of becoming Gazelles between t and t+3. The marginal effect at the mean is large: New firms have 32 percentage points more probability of being Gazelles.
The pooled estimations are also useful to study whether the effect of debt is different for new firms. To do so, we have also included in model 5 the interaction between the two debt variables and the start-up dummy. It seems however that this differential effect of debt is not significative. The reason is that the standard errors of those interactions are very large given the fact that the variance of debt is not enough for this particular group of firms.
Among the sector dummies we find that, ceteris paribus, firms operating in construction, services and non-ICT manufacturing have a higher probability of experiencing fast growth when compared to firms operating in ICT-manufacturing. The difference is significative at 5% confidence level in both windows. The result with respect to the service sector it is the same for ICT and non-ICT services is not surprising given the results found elsewhere in the literature. Maybe it seems a bit more surprising the fact that firms operating in the construction sector have higher chances of fast growth. This could be explained, however, by the construction boom experienced by the Spanish economy precisely during this period.
Finally, model 6 substitutes those aggregate sector dummies by 45 2-digit sector dummies. The purpose is to control as far as the dataset allows us for other firm-level characteristics that might be affecting the probability of growth, like sector riskiness, sector concentration etc. Results, however, do not change. Hence they seem to be quite robust.
To further check the robustness of the results, we have tried to run the regression using alternative measures of growth. Model A6 in Annex 1 shows the probit results using the OECD indicator defined above to mark high-growth firms. 
EFFECT ON THE PROBABILITY OF HIGH GROWTH FOR DIFFERENT CHANGES IN THE COVARIATES
Results are very similar to the ones reported elsewhere in this section with the exception of the effect of the debt ratio which is now not significant. Hence the initial debt ratio of a firm is not a significant determinant of firm growth, taken as a continuous variable. It can determine, however, whether the firm grows a lot (is among the Gazelle group) or not.
Note that so far we have studied the impact of several variables on the probability of being a Gazelle versus the probability of not being a Gazelle. That latter possibility includes being a firm with negative employment growth during the period of analysis as well as being a firm with positive but low employment growth. However, the transitions from negative growth to slow growth and from slow growth to fast growth, or gazelle, do not necessarily have to respond to the same factors. Hence, one final robustness check, interesting in itself, is to study whether the variables analysed so far affect in the same way these two margins.
To do so we have run a multinomial logit 30 in which the dependent variable takes a different value for each of the groups of firms mentioned previously: firms with negative employment growth over the period of analysis, firms with positive but slow growth and firms with fast employment growth. The result of the exercise is that the explanatory variables analysed affect the two transitions, from negative to slow growth and from slow to fast growth, in a similar way. The only difference is that the significance of all variables is somehow larger for the second transition.
We proceed now to show the quantitative impact on the probability of growth of the group of variables found to be significant for the Model 1 of Table 7 . Table 8 below reports the effects of a change in one explanatory variable for a hypothetical firm which has all other variables equal to their means.
31
The determinants of growth are past growth, human capital, sector of activity and access to finance. Indeed, the probability of growth increases by almost 30 percentage points if a firm has had fast growth in the previous period. That is, it seems that there is large growth inertia among Spanish firms. As explained before, when we remove this variable we are able to estimate the effect of newness on the probability of growth pooling all five windows. We find a large marginal effect: A start-up who survives up to t+3 has a probability of fast growth 32 percentage points (pp) higher than an established (surviving) firm.
30.
Results of the multinomial logit are available from the authors at request. 31. In the case of debt, we compute first the mean debt ratio, and then set the quadratic variable equal to this mean squared.
problem, we find that increasing the relative salary paid the first year of the first period of Hence, as it was shown in Table 7 , the relative salary, our proxy for firm's human capital, has an important and positive effect on the probability of fast growth, although that effect is marginally decreasing. Similarly, increasing the initial debt ratio from 42% to 62%
(from the 25 th percentile to the 50 th ) increases the probability of fast growth in 2.2 pp.
However, and this is different from the average wage effect, further increases of the initial debt ratio reduces the probability of growth. Lastly, the probability of fast growth of a firm operating in the ICT manufacturing sector is more than 6 pp lower than that of a firm operating in the construction sector (construction is the main element of the sector labelled as "other non-ICT sectors"). a. All diferences are significative (at 1%) for a given variable, moment and industry group, except those marked with an (=) sign. a. All diferences are significative (at 1%) for a given variable, moment and industry group, except those marked with an (=) sign. a. All diferences are significative (at 1%) for a given variable, moment and industry group, except those marked with an (=) sign. a. All diferences are significative (at 1%) for a given variable, moment and industry group, except those marked with an (=) sign. fixed-term contracts changing along the expansion path? The first purpose of this section aims to answer these relevant questions to better understand the growth process of firms in Spain. We do so by comparing the employment and capital structure at the beginning and at the end of the period of analysis of Gazelles with those of slow growers on the one hand and with the value of the variables of those firms that decreased employment over the period on the other hand. Considering the possibility that firms operating in sectors with different technology intensity could grow differently, we perform the analysis separately for producing and using ICT industries and for non-ICT industries. Another dimension worth analysing, above all in the Spanish case, is whether the growth of Gazelles is a quality-based growth, that is, whether it is based on high productivity and/or high wages. The comparison of the quality of growth of Gazelles with that of other types of firms is the second purpose of this section. Table 9 shows the results of this exercise. The first column corresponds to Gazelles, the second one to firms that increased their size over the period, but not enough to be considered a fast-growth firm (slow growers), and the third one to firms that decreased their employment over the period. The value of the variables at t is the average value of the corresponding variable at the beginning of each window of analysis (five in total). The value at t+3 is the average at the end of the period of analysis. The five variables analyzed are the share of employees with a permanent contract over total employment, the share of long and short term debt over total liabilities, labour productivity of the firm over average productivity of all firms operating in the same 2-digit sector, and average wage, also as a fraction of the average wage in the sector. We have performed a test to assess whether pairwise differences in initial and final values of the variables for each group of firms are statistically different.
We start analyzing changes in the employment composition of ICT firms. The first thing to notice is that the share of employees with permanent contracts increases in firms which are reducing employment over the period. This is the result of the fact that these firms are dismissing many more employees with temporary contracts than workers with permanent contracts (-29% versus -4% respectively). This is the consequence of the difference in firing costs between temporary and indefinite contracts in Spain, which pushes firms to adjust their personnel through changes in the amount of temporary employees.
The share of permanent contracts also increases in the case of slow growers, but to a lesser extent. These firms are increasing both types of employment, but fixed-term contracts grow at a slightly lower rate. Gazelles, on the other hand, have a very stable mix of both types of jobs. As a consequence, their share of permanent contracts, which is similar to the other two types of firms at the beginning of the period, ends up several percentage points below the other firms. This result reflects that: 1) Gazelles use evenly both types of jobs when growing; 2) Gazelles resort more to fixed-term contracts compared to other firms.
Although results are very similar for non-ICT firms, there are some differences worth stressing. First, non-ICT firms have more fixed-term employees, compared with ICT firms.
Second, this is especially the case for non-ICT fast-growth firms. And third, Gazelles increase fixed-term jobs slightly more than permanent jobs, which results in a small decrease in the share of permanent jobs at the end of the period.
Regarding the changes in liabilities composition, ICT firms with slow or negative growth (differences in this respect between both types of firms are not significantly different)
have a very stable long-term debt ratio, but a decreasing short-term debt ratio. This means that their liabilities composition is changing towards equity. On the contrary, Gazelles increase both types of debt, especially the long-term one. This happens in spite of the fact that they already had a higher debt ratio at the beginning of the three year period. Again, results are similar for non-ICT firms. Although all firms have more long term debt and less short term debt than in ICT sectors, maybe due to the fact that the construction sector is non-ICT, the pattern of increasing debt in Gazelles and increasing equity in other firms remain.
In summary, Gazelles use more fixed-term contracts and more debt to support their growth, compared to other firms. Now we start the second purpose of the section by looking at productivity and wages of Gazelles at the beginning and at the end of the period of analysis, compared to the other two types of firms. The first thing to notice is that at the beginning of each window, Gazelles have productivity levels well above other firms more than 30% higher than the average in the sector whereas the contrary happens to negative growth firms.
This happens both in ICT and non-ICT industries. However, the productivity of Gazelles decreases after three years of fast employment growth. Note that, despite this fall, their productivity level is still above the average level of the sector of activity at the end of the period. Likewise fast-growth firms' wages at the beginning of the period are about 25%
higher than average wages in the sector. After three years of fast growth their average wage, computed as wage payments over total employment in the firm, has been reduced although it is still over the economy average. We find a number of variables that are related to a higher probability of being a
Gazelle. The most important one is precisely having been a Gazelle in the previous period, and this is true even at a lower level of sector aggregation. Hence, at least during the period of time analysed in this paper, there is strong growth inertia. However, even controlling for past growth, there are other variables that are also significantly related to the probability of fast growth. First of all, new firms (that survive over the period) have about 30 pp more of probability than established firms to be a Gazelle. Hence, the removal of entry barriers seems to be crucial to enhance the number of fast-growth firms and, therefore, employment creation. Secondly, a higher level of human capital, proxied by relative wages, increases the probability of fast-growth monotonically. The need to invest in education to improve the skill pool, to improve the connection between the university and the enterprises, to facilitate training on the job etc. has been established since a long time. However our analysis highlights the importance of all those policies from another perspective, namely, to foster firm growth.
We find as well that an initial higher debt ratio increases the probability of fast growth only up to some point. Beyond, further debt increases impact negatively on that probability.
Hence better access to finance is indeed, as shown in other papers, facilitating the expansion of firms.
Regarding the growth pattern of Gazelles, we find that they resort more to fixed term employment and debt especially long term debt to sustain their growth, compared to other firms. They also start with a productivity level 30% higher than other firms, and in spite of their intense process of employment growth, they end up with a higher productivity level than other firms. 
